Table of Contents |
Behaviorist Arguments | Criticisms of Behaviorist Arguments | Behaviorist Responses to Criticisms | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Observation: The Case against Introspection | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Introspection--i.e., internal observation of one's own consciousness--is to be rejected because consciousness is not an objective object to be observed. | BUT that argument either
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Introspection is to be rejected because it is especially prone to error. | BUT introspection, when done properly, can be as objective as any other kind of observation. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Introspection is to be rejected because it is unreliable. Introspection is unreliable because the verbal community is unable to match exactly discrimination of verbal self-reports of internal stimuli (e.g., "I feel hungry") and discrimination of private internal stimuli (e.g., hunger pangs). Therefore, the link between introspective verbal reports and internal stimuli is unreliable. (Skinner [1986], for one, holds this position.) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
There is a public-private distinction. Introspection is to be rejected because introspective evidence and observations are private, i.e., available only to one observer, and are thus not objective.
| BUT introspective observations, like UFO reports, can be verified indirectly from
| YES, BUT introspective observations, unlike UFO reports, are not publically verifiable in principle. It is impossible to establish a correlation of eating behavior with an internal state like hunger (as opposed to just self-reports of hunger). | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
There is no public-private distinction. All observation is private: Knowledge of the external world is really an inference from the immediate but private percept. | BUT that means there is no reason not to trust private introspection. | NO, BECAUSE science is collaborative. Public (not private, introspective) behavior affords the most agreement and communication among observers. Therefore, in place of the subjective vs. objective distinction, the following methodological distinction should be made.
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The Behavioral Data Language: Selection of a Domain for Psychology
The is an a priori distinction between behavior and physiology. | Molar Behaviorism: A science of behavior autonomous from physiology is possible and desirable.
BUT the boundary between behavioral and physiological events is difficult to define.
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The is an a posteriori distinction between behavior and physiology. | Behavioral research leads to the discovery of laws, some of which cover more than behavior simply conceived. "Behavior" can be defined as whatever conforms to these laws. These laws are then organized by behavioral theories. The Behavioral Data Language: Selection of a Descriptive Language for Observational Reports
There can be purely objective descriptions. | Although theory influences observation, this influence can be overcome by observing more carefully, thereby leading to an objective database. BUT all observation is theory-laden.
| YES, BUT to evaluate the thesis of theory-ladenness requires either |
There cannot be purely objective descriptions. | There is a continuum from more to less theory-laden observational descriptions. Intersubjective agreement on descriptions indicates an acceptable degree of "objectivity." BUT intersubjective agreement may indicate only that observers share a common theoretical framework or paradigm.
| YES, BUT that is acceptable. The science of behavior can proceed as normal science within its own theoretical framework or paradigm.
| Purpose does NOT belong among the descriptive qualities of behavior. |
Purpose DOES belong among the descriptive qualities of behavior. |
Theoretical ConceptsTheoretical vocabulary should be restricted to operationally defined concepts. | Theoretical concepts are to be linked to the data language through operational definitions. BUT operationism does not provide suitable criteria for individuation of concepts. Any two things can be considered similar or different in an infinite variety of ways. (Cf. the discussion of problems of description in sociobiology [Lewontin, 1979].) One cannot know when to |
YES, BUT |
Theoretical vocabulary should NOT be restricted to operationally defined concepts, but should include INTERVENING VARIABLES. | Use of intervening variables should be allowed, but such variables are only labels for observed relationships, they are not unobserved entities or events. There is no unique set of valid intervening variables, and they have no unique representation. BUT |
NO, BECAUSE black-box theories conform to the deductive nomological method of explanation (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948): descriptions of behavior are deduced from general laws plus initial conditions.
| Theoretical vocabulary should NOT be restricted to operationally defined concepts, but should include HYPOTHETICAL CONSTRUCTS. | Use of hypothetical constructs should be allowed, and such constructs refer to unobserved entities or events, much as in physics. BUT psychology is unlike physics in that |
HYPOTHETICAL CONSTRUCTS (cont.) | Use of hypothetical constructs should be allowed, because hypothetical constructs bridge the gap between psychology and physiology. BUT |
TheorizingWithin behaviorism there are two modes of theorizing. Both presume that there exists a rigorous division between theory and observations. |
BUT |
(a) theory determines what is taken as fact, (b) theory cannot always adjust to fit contradictory data, and (c) sociological factors, rather than data, often determine a theory's acceptance or rejection. Theory-ladenness of observations just implies that the science of behavior will progress as normal science, i.e., linearly and continuously (until a scientific revolution overthrows behaviorism and replaces it with a new paradigm).
| S-R PsychologyNo major behaviorist holds that behavior is reflexive, i.e., that a stimulus is necessary and sufficient for a response.
| The Non-Cognitive Learning Approach | Environmental events that do not elicit a particular movement can come to do so through learning. Thus, a particular stimulus is not a necessary condition for a particular response. Learning consists of the association of stimuli and responses. The Cognitive Learning Approach | BUT learning should be described as the acquisition of knowledge. NO, BECAUSE then the relationship between knowledge and behavior remains unspecified. In theories postulating cognitive maps or observational learning, behavior is derived from the theory by assuming that the organism will behave appropriately given its knowledge. Such assumptions are not acceptably objective.
| Events inside the organism, as well as outside, can be considered "stimuli." | BUT Skinner, for one, holds that it is a mistake to suppose that there are internal stimuli (Evans, 1968, p. 21).
| Observed behavior is the result of integration of many reflexes. Therefore, it may have properties not possessed by any individual reflex.
| Operant responses are emitted, rather than elicited by stimuli. Thus, the S-R reflex thesis can be reduced to the claim that all behavior is functionally dependent upon the environment.
| BUT the environment and behavior are causally interdependent.
| YES, reciprocal determination, in which organisms alter the environment that controls them, is incorporated into many behaviorist theories.
| The Organization of Behavior: PurposeBehaviorists roundly reject teleological explanations, without denying that behavior has purposive characteristics (e.g., persistence, flexibility). These characteristics are accounted for non-teleologically in the three ways detailed below.
| Purpose is a state of the organism that determines the relationship between stimuli and responses. Purpose is a state variable that is brought about by certain motivational variables and that increases the probability of a certain class of responses.
| Purpose can be explained as stimuli that are maintained until eliminated by a goal-response. Behavior shows persistence because different goal-responses will continue to be emitted until the stimuli disappear. Behavior shows flexibility when new goal-responses succeed in eliminating the stimuli.
| Goal-directedness is only apparent, not real. Responses occur not to achieve future goals, but because they were reinforced in the past. Behavior shows persistence because of intermittent reinforcement. Behavior shows flexibility because many different kinds of responses may be reinforced, and thus an organism may possess a large repertoire of responses.
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(This table is adapted from Zuriff, 1986.)
Hempel, C., & Oppenheim, P. (1948). Studies in the logic of explanation. Philosophy of Science, 15, 135-175.
Lewontin, R. C. (1979). Sociobiology as an adaptationist program. Behavioral Science, 24, 5-14.
Skinner, B. F. (1986). Is it behaviorism? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 716.
Zuriff, G. E. (1986). Précis of Behaviorism: A conceptual reconstruction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 687-724.
Last modified April 1998
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References
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Behaviorism Links
"Behaviorism as a Theory of Personality: A Critical Look"
Behaviorism: Papers Elsewhere
This paper concludes, "As a result of this critical look at behaviorism, its weaknesses as a comprehensive personality theory are revealed. At the same time, its merits when restricted to certain areas of psychology and treatment of disorders are discussed." By Payal Naik.
"Can Behaviorism Still Apply in the Face of Overwhelming Opposition?"
This paper discusses the cognitive science approach that has been gaining ground on behaviorism in the past three decades. By Eileen Pizzurro.
"Reconciling the Mental and the Behavioral: An Evaluation of Behaviorism"
This paper critiques Skinner's theory of radical behaviorism, which denies the reality of mental processes. By Alissa D. Eischens.
"B. F. Skinner"
Behaviorism: Websites Elsewhere
This paper is an introduction to Skinner's theory. By C. George Boeree.
"Behaviorism: Skinner and Dennett"
This paper discusses Skinner's attack on mentalism, the appeal to inner psychological phenomena. By Curtis Brown.
"Behaviourism: The Early Years"
This paper is a scholarly introduction to behaviorism. By Robert Wozniak.
"Comparing Brelands' Theory of Instictive Drift to Seligman's Theory of Preparedness"
This paper discusses two approaches to the biological basis of learning. By Sarah Feldstein.
"Learning Theory"
This paper distinguishes behavior analysis, radical behaviorism, mentalism, and
methodological behaviorism. By Jay Moore.
"Walden 'U'"
Read about a behaviorally based liberal arts college with striking similarities to on-line courses of instruction. By Bruce A. Thyer.
Classics in the History of Psychology
Behaviorism: Reference Sources
This website links to classic works on behaviorism by major theorists. By Christopher D. Green.
Features of Classical Conditioning
This explication of classical conditioning contains useful graphs. Reconstructed from a lecture by Robert W. Kentridge.
Operant Conditioning and Behaviorism: An Historical Outline
This is a discussion of the emergence of behaviorism. Reconstructed from a lecture by Robert W. Kentridge.
Positive Reinforcement: A Self-Instructional Exercise
This exercise makes a game of learning about positive reinforcement by positively reinforcing right answers. By Lyle K. Grant.
Psychology with Sociology: Memory Module
This tutorial features classical, operant, and observational learning. By the Center for Advanced Technologies.
Public Broadcasting System
Theory into Practice Database
This website introduces the following learning theories:
(1) Guthrie,
(2) Hull,
(3) Skinner,
(4) Thorndike,
(5) Tolman.
By Greg Kearsley.
Welcome to the Behaviorist's Diner!
This website contains brief discussions of the educational uses of behaviorism. By Jim Laffey.
B. F. Skinner's Complete Bibliography
This list of references includes a graph of Skinner's cumulative publication record. By the B. F. Skinner Foundation.
Suggested Readings
A list of suggested readings on this topic is also available. By G. Scott Acton.
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